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Abstract 
This research paper addresses the interrelationship between the securitization of 
migration and the influence of the French populist radical right party, Front National (FN), in 
promoting anti-migrant claims. By analysing how political actors have played a role in applying 
security terms to migration in Europe, the paper addresses the different types of socio-political 
factors that have influenced the anti-migrant sentiment in France. The paper also aims to 
summarize the role of the media in securitizing migration. Furthermore, the analysis continues 
with an exploration of French security policy with regard to migration to better understand how 
FN has benefitted from a public conceptual understanding of migration as a security threat. To 
develop a comprehensive analysis, this paper incorporates both traditional primary and 
secondary academic sources as well as field-based interactive research including four face-to-
face, formal interviews with academic experts. 
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Introduction  
With over a million people irregularly entering Europe in 2015 (well over the 280,000 the 
year before), 1 the situation has been described as nothing less than a migration ‘crisis.’ The large 
number of migrants and asylum seekers entering Europe today pose various political questions 
that are now testing the current interconnected political entity of Europe. Heightened fears and 
public perceptions of potential terrorist attacks, rising unemployment issues, resource pressures 
and cultural clashes represent just a few of the concerns that European politicians need to 
address. Arguably, such a rise in irregular immigration in Europe has influenced the saliency, 
visibility, and popularity of extreme-right populist parties across Europe. As national elections 
provide a window of opportunity for political restructuring throughout Europe in which some 
groups advocate for extreme policy responses to migration, current political actors are delegated 
with the task of identifying the best way to protect migrants’ and asylum seekers’ inalienable 
human rights but also address the concerns of part of the national electorate that fears much of 
what current migration entails. To better understand solutions to this issue, it would be helpful to 
analyse the theoretical concepts and real-life trends about migration, security and extreme-right 
populism that might provide insight into how these complex concepts interact.  
The main objective of this research paper is to identity the socio-political forces that 
create an environment in France that allows for anti-migrant claims and sentiments to be made 
and sustained. Through analysing the key themes of security, migration, extreme right parties, 
populism, and the media, this paper intends to better understand the interrelationship between the 
securitization of migration and the influence of the French populist party, Front National (FN), 
in promoting anti-migrant claims.  
                                                        
1 BBC News. “Why Is EU Struggling with Migrants and Asylum?” BBC News. BBC, 3 Mar. 2016. Web. 3 Oct. 
2016.  
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 First, the paper details the broadening of the security studies field and defines the 
securitization of migration based on the seminal work of the Copenhagen School for Security 
Studies. This paper focuses on the societal aspect of security studies, while the national security 
threats of potential terrorist attacks largely remains outside the scope of this paper. The central 
aspects of securitizing migration highlight the framework it provides for politicians and other 
actors to make anti-migrant claims. Then, the paper addresses the ‘rise’ of populism and the 
extreme right and how these parties interact with the topic of migration. The concept of issue 
ownership of migration demonstrates how populist right-wing parties might be legitimized or 
seen as a valid source of migration policy proposals. The paper then addresses the role of the 
media as an outlet and an actor in making or supporting anti-migrant claims. Finally, this paper 
provides an analysis on the way migration has been securitized in France since the 1980s and 
how the FN specifically has relied on the foundation of migration as a security issue to make 
anti-migrant claims. This section includes information about how migration in France has been 
incorporated into French and European security policy and rhetoric by more than just right wing 
populist parties; it includes a historical description about French security policy that identifies 
migration as a security threat. 
Literature Review 
The Copenhagen School for Security Studies, lead by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, has 
provided the theoretical framework that describes how security studies and policies post-cold 
war have been reshaped and broadened. Particularly in the work “Security: a new framework for 
analysis,” 2 the Copenhagen School describes how migration has been introduced into security 
                                                        
2 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De. Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Pub., 1998. 
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policy and rhetoric. Furthermore, much of the recent literature in security studies points to the 
affect of the political actions taken after September 11th on how states, citizens and the media all 
conceptualize migration as a security issue.3 4 5 6 Many scholars and experts describe the 
processes in which politicians through ‘speech acts’ incorporate migration into security terms, 7 8 
9 10 while other scholars have focused more on how national or EU policies encompass migration 
into security policy. 11 12 13 14  
In terms of populism and the rise of extreme-right political parties in France, the 
literature addresses the commonalities between different populist parties 15 16 17 18 and the ways 
                                                        
3 Cesari, Jocelyne. "Securitization of Islam in Europe." Die Welt Des Islams 52, no. 3-4 (2012): 430-49. Accessed October 26, 
2016. doi:10.1057/9781137121202.0011. 
4 Karyotis, Georgios. "European Migration Policy In The Aftermath Of September 11." Innovation: The European Journal of 
Social Science Research 20, no. 1 (March 01, 2007): 1-17. Accessed October 26, 2016. 
doi:10.1080/13511610701197783. 
5 Taras, Raymond. "Approaching the End Times? The Securitization of Paris-and Beyond." Harvard International Review. 
February 27, 2015. Accessed October 26, 2016. 
6 Baker-Beall, C. (2009). ‘The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the ‘Migrant Other’, 
Securitisation and Control’, Journal of Contemporary European Research. 5 (2), pp. 188-206. 
7 Buzan et. al, Security. 
8 Karyotis, Georgios. "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration: Elite Rationality and Unintended Consequences." In Security, 
Insecurity and Migration in Europe, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, 13-29. Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed 
October 27, 2016.  
9 Togral, Burcu. "Convergence of Securitization of Migration and ‘New Racism’ in Europe: Rise of Culturalism and 
Disappearance of Politics." In Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, edited by Gabriella Lazaridis, 219-37. 
Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016. ProQuest ebrary. 
10 Giugni, Marco, Ruud Koopmans, Florence Passy, and Paul Statham. "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities for Extreme-
Right Mobilization in Five Countries." Mobilization 10, no. 1 (2005): 145-62. Accessed October 27, 2016. 
http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:84641. 
11 O’Neill, P.E. "The European Union and Migration: Security versus Identity?" Defence Studies 6, no. 3 (September 01, 2006): 
322-50. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1080/14702430601060149. 
12 Marin, Luisa, and Alessandro Spena. "Introduction: The Criminalization of Migration and European (Dis)Integration." 
European Journal of Migration and Law 18, no. 2 (2016): 147-56. Accessed October 26, 2016. doi:10.1163/15718166-
12342096. 
13 Taras, "Approaching the End Times?”  
14 Baker-Beall, “The Discursive Construction of EU”  
15 Wirth, Werner, Frank Esser, Martin Wettstein, Sven Engesser, Dominique Wirz, Anne Schulz, Nicole Ernst, Florin Buchel, 
Daniele Caramani, Luca Manucci, Marco Steenbergen, Laurent Bernhard, Edward Weber, Regula Hanggli, Caroline 
Dalmus, and Christian Schemer. The Appeal of Populist Ideas, Strategies and Styles: A Theoretical Model and 
Research Design for Analyzing Populist Political Communication. Swiss National Science Foundation. National Centre 
of Competence in Research (NCCR) Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century. May 2016. Accessed November 8, 
2016. 
16 Krastev, Ivan. "The Populist Moment." Eurozine. September 18, 2007. Accessed November 08, 2016. 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-18-krastev-en.html. 
17 Giugni et. al, "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities”  
18 Arzheimer, Kai, and Elisabeth Carter. "Political Opportunity Structures and Right-wing Extremist Party Success." European 
Journal of Political Research 45, no. 3 (2006): 419-43. Accessed November 1, 2016. doi:10.1111/j.1475-
6765.2006.00304.x. 
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that these parties interact with the rest of the political environment. 19 20 21 22 Much of the 
discussion about the current situation of populism in France comes from news articles and other 
news media outlets that highlight the success of Front National and Marine Le Pen in gaining 
electorate and public support. 23 24 25 26 Counterpoint’s quantitative analysis on the extent to 
which French press framing of issues corresponds to those of Front National also provides a 
comprehensive study that highlights the role of the media in the rise of Front National.  
Many scholars describe the concepts and modern realizations of populism, right-wing 
extremism, migration, and security, but there seems to be a few published academic research that 
analyses how exactly the securitization of migration has played a role in the rise of right-wing 
extremist parties. Much research draws upon how extreme right-wing parties’ rhetoric utilizes 
terms that conceptualize migration within the security realm. However, identifying causal 
relationships between these phenomena is difficult, if not unreasonable. Most literature seeks to 
unpack the relationship and interaction between these political forces within the grand scheme of 
domestic or international politics. Future research could examine the extent to which various 
                                                        
19 Buzan et. al, Security. 
20 Wirth et. al, The Appeal of Populist Ideas. 
21 Mudde, C. (2013). Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what? European Journal of Political 
Research, 52(1), 1–19. doi:10.1111/j.1475- 6765.2012.02065.x 
22 Minkenberg, Michael. "The Radical Right in Public Office: Agenda-setting and Policy Effects." West European 
Politics 24, no. 4 (October 2001): 1-21. Accessed November 1, 2016. doi:10.1080/01402380108425462. 
23 Banulescu-Bogdan, Natalia, and Elizabeth Collett. "Top 10 of 2015 – Issue #6: Refugee Crisis Deepens Political 
Polarization in the West." Migrationpolicy.org. December 11, 2015. Accessed November 10, 2016. 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2015-issue-6-refugee-crisis-deepens-political-polarization-
west. 
24 Mount, Ian. "Why Populist Parties Are Booming Across Europe." Fortune. April 04, 2016. Accessed November 
10, 2016. http://fortune.com/2016/04/04/populist-parties-europe/. 
25 Vinocur, Nicholas. "Le Pen's Revolt against France's Political Class." POLITICO. November 12, 2015. Accessed 
November 10, 2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/le-pen-rise-revolt-against-france-political-class-elites-
far-right-populism/. 
26 Özerim, Mehmet Gökay. "European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration." International 
Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering 7, no. 8 
(2013): 2196-200. Accessed November 14, 2016. 
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right wing groups in Europe, in the advent of the current migration challenge since 2015, have 
gained ground and popularity because of the securitization of migration.  
Research Methodology  
This research project incorporated a variety of sources to develop a comprehensive 
analysis on all of the political and social factors that influence the rise of populist parties in 
France. Specifically, this paper relies on primary sources including interviews with experts in the 
field of security, migration, and populist parties in Europe, and government documents that 
outline migration and security policy in France. The secondary sources include qualitative 
analyses on the theories of securitization of migration and the rise of populist and extreme right 
parties. Other secondary sources include newspaper articles and commentaries regarding the 
current migration crisis in Europe and the 2017 French presidential race. The main methods of 
collecting data included online searches through various research journals as well as searches for 
experts in the fields of study.   
In terms of ethical considerations, this paper recognizes that the interviews need to be 
respectful and professional. Each interviewee was informed of the purpose of the interview, 
his/her right to remain anonymous, and was ensured that any interview quote to be included in 
the paper would be sent via email to the interviewee to guarantee the correctness of the quote.  
Definitions and the analytical/theoretical framework 
 This paper relies on the Copenhagen School’s characterization of the ‘securitization’ of 
migration. The Copenhagen School takes a constructivist approach to the security agenda that 
analyses how political actors transform ‘normal’ phenomenon into the security realm, which 
justifies an emergency response from a government. 27 Through this theoretical framework, this 
                                                        
27 Buzan et. al, Security. 
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paper identifies how political actors in France have placed migration onto the national security 
agenda.  
 Furthermore, despite the academic difficulties defining populism, this paper establishes a 
definition of the extreme-right populist party (the term ‘populist radical right party’ is also used) 
based on other scholars’ identifications of the common theories, ideologies, and claims of these 
parties. Populist parties are defined as political groups that argue that the people have an 
unalienable right to sovereignty and that the elite political cohort continually threatens to deny 
people this right. 28 29 30 31 Populist radical right parties’ ideology includes elements of nativism, 
32 ultra nationalism, 33 34 and ethnocultural pluralism with restrictive definitions of their own 
society. 35 Because of their xenophobic and nationalist ideologies, these populist radical right 
parties also contribute to much of the anti-migrant rhetoric in various nations. 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 
44 
                                                        
28 Wirth et. al, The Appeal of Populist Ideas. 
29 Krastev, "The Populist Moment.” 
30 European Humanist Foundation. The European Union and the Challenge of Extremism and Populism: How to 
Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law in Europe? Report. October 2013. Accessed November 10, 2016. 
31 Vinocur, "Le Pen's Revolt against France's Political Class."  
32 Mudde, C. (2013). “Three decades of populist radical right parties in Western Europe: So what?” European 
Journal of Political Research, 52(1), 1–19. doi:10.1111/j.1475- 6765.2012.02065.x 
33 Minkenberg, "The Radical Right in Public Office.”  
34 European Humanist Foundation. “The European Union” 
35 Liang, Christina Schori, ed. Europe for the Europeans : The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical 
Right. Abingdon, GB: Routledge, 2007. Accessed November 3, 2016. ProQuest ebrary. 
36 Banulescu-Bogdan and Collett. " Refugee Crisis Deepens Political Polarization in the West."  
37 Özerim, "European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration." 
38 Nilsson, Per-Erik. "‘Secular Retaliation’: A Case Study of Integralist Populism, Anti-Muslim Discourse, and 
(Il)liberal Discourse on Secularism in Contemporary France." Politics, Religion & Ideology 16, no. 1 
(February 17, 2015): 87-106. Accessed November 10, 2016. doi:10.1080/21567689.2015.1012160. 
39 Taras, "Approaching the End Times?” 
40 Giugni et. al, "Institutional and Discursive Opportunities.” 
41 European Humanist Foundation. “The European Union.” 
42 Minkenberg, "The Radical Right in Public Office.” 
43 Liang, Europe for the Europeans. 
44 Evans, Jocelyn A.J. “’La politique du dehors avec les raisons du dedans’: foreign and defence policy of the French 
Front National.” Edited by Christina Schori Liang. Europe for the Europeans : The Foreign and Security 
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Analysis 
Defining the securitization of migration: Lessons from the Copenhagen School and 9/11 
 In a post-Cold War security studies debate, scholars faced a conceptual decision to widen 
or narrow the definition of security in which the boundaries of security studies would expand 
beyond topics related to the threat or use of force.45 While some scholars argued that a 
progressive widening would jeopardize the “entire fabric of social and international relations,” 46 
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde from the Copenhagen School for Security Studies conceptualized 
security studies in a broader sense. They challenged the traditional method of confining security 
to military discourse and a rigid understanding of relevant sectors and instead investigated the 
process and logic of security as it relates to various aspects of daily socio-political life.47 
According to their framework, instead of relating to traditional concepts of the stability and 
persistence of a state and its sovereignty, security can relate to any issue that is “presented as 
posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” that “justifies the use of extraordinary 
measures to handle them.” 48 Any referent object that is deemed threatened by an existential 
force legitimizes “actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” and thus becomes 
securitized. 49 It is the ‘speech act,’ or the actual expression of a topic referring to security, that 
securitizes the referent object.50  
The Copenhagen Schools’ understanding of security studies includes different sectors 
that incorporate various part of daily human life: military, political, economic, societal, and 
                                                        
Policy of the Populist Radical Right. 125-138. Abingdon, GB: Routledge, 2007. Accessed November 3, 
2016. ProQuest ebrary. 
 
45 Buzan et. al, Security, 2. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, 5. 
48 Ibid, 21.  
49 Ibid, 24. 
50 Ibid, 26.  
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environmental. 51 These sectors serve as a conceptual expansion of security and work to 
differentiate how all components of a state or region are securitized or merely politicized.52 P.E. 
O’Neill mentions that traditionally the nation-state is the center of security debate, but the 
Copenhagen School created a new framework that identifies the complex security environment 
and analyses how different sectors affect each other.53 
 In this paper, the relevant sector of security as it relates to migration is societal security. 
According to Buzan et. al, societal security’s referent object refers to large-scale collective 
identities of a society.54 These identities naturally evolve and change according to internal and 
external pressures, but “whether migrants or rival identities are securitized depends upon 
whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively closed-minded or relatively open-
minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained.”55 O’Neill emphasizes that 
societal security does not depend on whether or not the cause of security threat is real or not, but 
rather how states and polities react to this debate based on the perceptions of their societies.56 
Georgios Karyotis similarly posits that any force that threatens the identity of a society 
“challenges the very existence of a traditional pattern of living” and thus can be conceived as a 
security threat.57 Specifically, the process of securitizing migration includes an understanding 
that migrants and ‘outsiders’ pose a threat to the collective cultural identity as they challenge the 
homogeneity and collectivity of a society. O’Neill describes how states are expected to uphold 
borders, sovereignty, and a relatively stable national identity, and migration threatens these 
                                                        
51 Ibid, 7.  
52 Buzan et. al, Security. 
53 O’Neill, "The European Union and Migration” 323.  
54 Buzan et. al, Security, 22. 
55 Ibid, 23.  
56 O’Neill, “The European Union and Migration,” 330. 
57 Karyotis, "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration,” 13. 
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objectives; migration is viewed through a security lens insofar as it threatens the cultural 
cohesion and exclusive national identity of a society.58  
Within a given political space, the role of elite political actors in securitizing migration 
serves as an essential aspect of analysis for modern security studies.59 Karyotis mentions that it is 
the political elites of Europe “who often see themselves as defenders of national purity and 
societal security” that aim to place migration within security terms and treat migrants and asylum 
seekers as a threat to a society’s cultural identity.60 This process of defining migrants as threats 
to collective identity is what securitizes migration. As Raymond Taras describes, it is the 
“entrenched elites which have been imposing counterproductive and unpopular policies” about 
restricting migration that solidify the securitization of migration.61 Anastassia Tsoukala posits 
that European political elites, who fear a loss of sovereignty due to globalization and 
Europeanization, place blame on foreigners for social problems, justifying strict immigration 
policies as a way to protect borders, and uphold a sense of control over collective national 
identity.62 The mainstream political elites, she argues, transmit discourse that describes a reality 
of national culture that is threatened by outsiders.63 Karyotis describes that elites support the 
security-migration nexus because they believe they are serving their country’s interests and 
therefore are justified in their positions towards migrants.64 This assumption of serving the 
country’s interests, however, is unfounded and untrue, according to Karyotis.65 When elites place 
                                                        
58 O’Neill, “The European Union and Migration,” 325. 
59 Buzan et. al, Security, 36. 
60 Karyotis, "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration,” 20. 
61 Taras, Raymond. "Approaching the End Times? The Securitization of Paris-and Beyond." Harvard International 
Review. February 27, 2015. Accessed October 26, 2016. 
62 Tsoukala, Anastassia. "Turning Immigrants into Security Threats: A Multi-faceted Process." In Research in 
Migration and Ethnic Relations Series: Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe, edited by Gabriella 
Lazaridis, 180. Farnham, UK: Routledge, 2016. Accessed October 27, 2016. 
63 Ibid, 192. 
64 Karyotis, "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration,” 19. 
65 Ibid, 23. 
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migration within the security framework of the nation, they create a society that “lives in 
permanent fear from the real or perceived threats” and “exacerbates negative effects on societal 
homogeneity and harmony through its distractive unintended consequences.” 66 Securitizing 
migration, he argues, is not a conducive way to manage migration; it prevents elites from 
working effectively and promoting the nuances of labor needs for migration because “the 
distinctions between ‘desirable’ economic migrants, asylum seekers and irregular migrations 
become muddled in the public mind.”67 What follows is a construction of national security from 
the bottom-up instead of top-down, which can constrain political action and choices for policy 
nuances.68  
        Furthermore, within the literature about security studies, many scholars point to the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 as a pivotal moment that reinforced the way 
nations address migration within a modern security framework. Jocelyne Cesari describes how 
the ‘War on Terror’ regards Islam as an existential threat that necessitates an emergency political 
response outside the bounds of regular action. 69 The legal responses to terrorism after September 
11th, have led to serious limitations on Islamic religious practices. 70 As Christopher Baker Beall 
describes, post-9/11 policy responses of strengthening borders and increasing surveillance 
personified a meta-narrative of ‘control’ in which a “discursive link between the 
danger/risk/threat of terrorism and migration, asylum and border control” was emphasized.71 
Karyotis characterizes the period as inextricably linking migration to security as “it became 
almost unthinkable to refer to the fight against terrorism without special reference to the threats 
                                                        
66 Karyotis, "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration,” 23. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Cesari, "Securitization of Islam in Europe,” 430. 
70 Ibid, 432.  
71 Baker-Beall, C. (2009). ‘The Discursive Construction of EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: Writing the ‘Migrant 
Other’, Securitisation and Control’, Journal of Contemporary European Research. 5 (2), pp. 196. 
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posed by migration.” 72 He argues that the attacks of September 11 did not necessarily catalyze 
the uncertainties and issues of security with regard to migration policy, “rather they accelerated 
dynamics that were already deeply rooted in the emerging European internal security regime.” 73  
Whether or not the basis for securitizing migration is valid or justified, politicians and 
citizens must be aware of how securitizing the natural phenomenon affects the lives of migrants 
and is problematic for general politics. As Karyotis describes, the securitization of migration 
highlights how citizens and politicians of a nation claim that “our security justifies limitations to 
their rights” which legitimizes restrictive policies against migrants of specific religious or ethnic 
backgrounds. 74 The securitization of migration not only interferes with European values of 
equality, human rights, and legal obligations to asylum seekers, but also distracts policy makers 
from real issues of migration management policies. 75 Dr. Khalid Koser, of the Global 
Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, describes that while politicians are faced with 
challenges of migration and public concerns that come along with failure to integrate, labor 
competition, and environmental damage, there exist risks to securitizing migration (i.e. the 
government legitimizing extraordinary responses).76  “Politicians should be able to say that 
national security is paramount,” he argues, but still the main goal is to “manage migration to 
maximize it.” 77  
Populism and the extreme-right party  
Populist radical right parties for many years have relied upon xenophobic, nationalist, and 
popular sovereignty ideologies to gain support and make claims that reject the social inclusion of 
                                                        
72 Karyotis. "European Migration Policy, 6. 
73 Karyotis. "European Migration Policy, 13. 
74 Karyotis, "The Fallace of Securitizing Migration,” 16. 
75 Karyotis, “European Migration Policy,” 12. 
76 Koser, Khalid. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Geneva, 27 October 2016. 
77 Ibid. 
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migrants or regard migrants as security threats. These parties utilize “enforcement-laden 
language” to demonstrate control over the national migration situation that many see as 
ungoverned. 78 While there exist many different political actors that contribute to the 
securitization of migration, populist radical right parties especially play a key role in promoting 
rhetoric that capitalizes on the public anxieties towards migrants and places migration within a 
national security context to protect original national values. 79 These groups present “immediate 
and demagogical solutions to people’s day to day problems” 80 that rely upon a belief that 
international migration has posed a significant threat to the society’s traditional culture and 
safety. 81 Specifically with the case of the France, the primacy of French culture and sense of 
ethno-cultural superiority has meant that many French people aim to protect their culture from 
internal and external foreign threats, especially that of migrants. 82 Cenni Najy characterizes that 
“the extreme right is focused on the preservation of a set of identities… which they think are 
threatened by globalization.” 83 As Christin Achermann posits, one of the major issues in the 
case of France is the religious aspect that plays a role in barriers to inclusion.84 Achermann 
describes how Muslims in France are often portrayed as being menaces to society and how 
certain political parties work towards stigmatizing immigrants of Muslim origins.85 When 
populist radical right parties draw upon realities and legitimate issues to advance solutions that 
counteract ideals of inclusion and universalism, there remains an overwhelming sense of social 
exclusion and ‘otherness.’ 
                                                        
78 Banulescu-Bogdan and Collett. " Refugee Crisis Deepens Political Polarization in the West." 
79 Özerim, "European Radical Right Parties as Actors in Securitization of Migration," 2198. 
80 European Humanist Foundation. “The European Union,” 2.  
81 Liang, Europe for the Europeans, 18. 
82 Evans, “’La politique du dehors,” 129. 
83 Najy, Cenni. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Geneva, 16 November 16.  
84Achermann, Christin. Interview by Ashley Middleton. Personal Interview. Neuchatel, 15 November 2016. 
85 Achermann, Christin. Interview by Ashley Middleton.  
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 While states continue to experience populist movements that aim to re-imagine the 
current political system, the current phase of populism in Europe has been characterized as a rise 
of democratic illiberalism. Populist democratic movements are illiberal insofar as they advocate 
for a government run by the people, reject representative democracy claiming that elite 
politicians are unreliable and corrupt, and oppose a heterogeneous acknowledgement of the 
populace.86 As defined by Ivan Krastev, the populist movement is in fact the rise of democratic 
illiberalism not so much because these movements aim to abolish democracy, but rather because 
they oppose the “representative nature of modern democracies, the protection of the rights of 
minorities and the constraints to the sovereignty of the people.” 87 The discourse that political 
elites are corrupt combined with the situation in which “European elites secretly dream of a 
system that will deprive irresponsible voters of the power to undermine rational politics” 
exacerbates the deep-seeded mistrust and failure of communication between the two groups. 88  
 What provides populist radical right parties much of their rationalization for anti-migrant 
claims depends on the citizenship regimes of the relevant country. 89According to Giugni et. al, 
the citizenship regime of a nation refers to “prevailing conceptions and shared understandings of 
the criteria of membership in a nation, [which] provide[s] a framework for explaining the 
varying impact of challenging groups that mobilize in the field of immigration.” 90 France’s civic 
assimilationist approach suggests that the nation has a tendency to impose republican values on 
migrants91 and expect migrants to conform to French culture, rejecting some of their unique 
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traditions. The French citizenship regime provides a ‘discursive opportunity’ for populist radical 
right parties to make anti-migrant claims as these remarks “resonate with the legitimate 
ethnocultural conception of citizenship and national identity.” 92 Based on the ideology of the 
extreme right populist parties, if a migrant does not conform to an imposed set of norms, (s)he is 
rejected from being a ‘true’ French citizen and the way to reject her/him from society is to 
prevent her/him from coming to France in the first place. It is a restricted model of citizenship in 
France that helps establish a favorable environment for populist radical right parties to make 
anti-migrant claims.  
 Populist radical right parties cannot be examined without taking into consideration the 
political institutional opportunities, interactions with other established political actors, and a 
sense of issue ownership with regards to migration that allow a populist radical right party to be 
successful. Giugni et. al define the political institutional opportunity for radical right claims-
making partly as a function of the political space of the right 93; if there exists no other party on 
the right, then there is ample space for a new populist party or old party with renewed populist 
discourse to fill the void. 94 Arzheimer and Carter similarly attribute the success of a party not 
from the actual political actor, but because of the general political structures (including: the 
electoral system, ideological position of competitors in the party system, and levels of 
immigration and unemployment) 95 that produce opportunities for groups to accumulate electoral 
or ideological support. 96 Furthermore, according to Minkenberg, policy outcomes result from 
pathway dependencies of other political parties’ actions in the policy making process. 97 
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Specifically in France, “a longtime consensus on immigration was undermined by the very 
different manner in which the established parties handled the FN at the electoral level.” 98 
Populist radical right parties influenced mainstream parties by presenting electoral competition 
and thus necessitating mainstream groups to shift towards more populist and nativist tendencies 
with regard to migration policy.99 100 Mudde contends that the actions of mainstream groups in 
the past laid the foundation for much of the migration-security policy nexus as they implemented 
migration management policies that conceptualized (either overtly or subtly) as related to 
national security issues. 101 Taras uniquely problematizes the situation and identifies European 
political elites who “impose counterproductive and unpopular policies adversely affecting 
Muslims and nativists alike that contribute to interethnic tensions” rather than the populist 
radical right anti-migration rhetoric. 102 Finally, it is the sense of issue ownership that can 
oftentimes legitimizes radical right anti-migration policies in the eyes of the electorate. As 
Giugni mentions, the parties that are known for dealing with certain issues oftentimes are seen as 
legitimate sources of policy recommendations for the electorate,103 and in the case of migration, 
the populist radical right parties are often known for maintaining this issue as one of their 
hallmark identifiers.  
How media affects securitization of migration and extreme-right parties  
 Media outlets serve as essential sources for political news and commentary, liaisons 
between politicians and citizens, and framers of different political situations. Media serves not 
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only as a “self-interested actor,” but also as a “facilitating infrastructure” 104 that can serve as a 
“vehicle for certain discourse.” 105 An outlet’s political orientation can shape how populist right 
wing parties, populist rhetoric, and migrants are represented and constructed in the public 
conscious. 106 Whether or not the source presents information in an intentionally biased way, the 
outlet still transports images and framings that in turn have an effect on the way migrants are 
represented.107 As Anastassia Tsoukala explains, the ways that migrants are represented in the 
media can contribute to the validation of some of the populist radical right’s anti-migrant policy 
proposals and rhetoric. 108 Koser mentions that the effectiveness of the right wing parties to 
utilize the media has influenced how citizens conceptualize migration in security terms.109 
During the 1980s and 1990s in French media outlets, Muslim migrants were represented as 
dangerous threats to French secular democracy and harmful to domestic economies. 110 In the 
late 2000s, immigrants were seen as vital components to national economy, but it was “assumed 
that their presence on the territory [was] tolerated as long as, and to the extent that, they [were] 
deemed necessary to cover domestic need.” 111 News stories that present an account of 
overwhelming numbers of migrants, migrants committing crimes, and stories that lack nuance 
create situations in which stereotypes and general fears are bred in the public mind.  
With regard to the Front National specifically, there exists an interesting and 
“paradoxical” 112 relationship between the party and the media outlets that cover their issues. The 
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press aims to cover stories that the general public takes interest in, oftentimes the same topics 
proclaimed by the FN, which inadvertently legitimizes some of the party’s rhetoric. 113 Although 
journalists and reporters oftentimes intend to oppose the rhetoric presented by the FN, the press 
still covers much of the same topics that the FN has issue ownership over: “insecurity, Islam, 
immigration and political weakness.” 114 115 As the press continues to highlight FN policies and 
the party in general, the more important these issues seem in the readership populations,116 the 
more the FN becomes accessible in voters’ minds, and the more likely they are to be considered 
as an option when voting. 117 As Bos et. al outline in their research analysis on media coverage of 
right wing populist parties, media coverage has a small yet noticeable effect on party support in 
terms of discourse on migration regardless of it the party was mentioned. 118 Hobeika and 
Villeneuve characterize the situation in a more dramatic stance: “far right rhetoric on security has 
invaded discussion on immigration and security, and drives the actions of policy-makers and 
leaders.” 119 To them, the media justifies the presence of migration and security on the national 
agenda as “minor incidences are dramatized” and commentaries and criticisms overwhelm a 
“context of relative safety and stable immigration.” 120 
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Securitizing migration in France and Front National’s security policy proposals  
 Since the 1980s, migration in Europe has been regarded as a national and international 
security issue, formalized in national and European Union level security policies and agreements. 
Although post World War II migration was regarded as essential for economic reconstruction of 
collapsed European economies, the oil crisis in the mid 1970s increased unemployment rates and 
led to restrictive migration policies as migrants were seen as foreign competitors in the national 
labor markets.121 The 1980s and beyond were dominated by a ‘Europeanization’ of internal 
security policies as European agreements like the Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam Treaty, Single 
European Act, the Ad Hoc Group on Asylum and Immigration, the Schengen Treaty, and 
Europol became formalized. 122 Burcu Togral defines what was once “seen as an innocent 
economic activity, blessed with a vital role in the construction of European economies after 
World War Two, welcomed and encouraged by European states,” migration now came to be a 
security matter that threatened European states and was frequently associated with “criminality, 
socio-economic problems, cultural deprivation, and lately to terrorism.” 123 At the same time, 
there was an ‘externalization of security threats,’ 124 as a meta-narrative of the immigrant ‘other’ 
and potential threat to European identity was formalized in European internal security policy. 125 
Strengthening the visa and asylum policies demonstrated the EU’s hard legal power in 
essentially emphasizing security concerns over the rights of migrants. 126 European emphasis on 
border control and maintenance of ‘acceptable’ flows of people to the region demonstrate how 
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the European polity stressed the permanent cultural integrity of the region and in turn regarded 
migrants as threats.  
 When looking specifically at the policy standpoints of the FN, it becomes evident that the 
group maintains overtly critical ideologies about migrants and the threats to French cultural 
Exceptionalism. Jocelyn Evans provides a helpful description of FN foreign and domestic 
policies from the mid-2000s under the leadership of Jean Marie Le Pen that highlight the party’s 
concern over economic and strategic strength but more importantly “the primacy of identity.” 127 
FN’s policy platform proposes a movement towards the predominance of France and French 
decisions in Western development, protectionism of French cultural identity which is under 
threat from internal and external forces, national isolationism as globalization has jeopardized 
French identity, post-colonial imperialism to continue to exploit geopolitical opportunities to 
benefit France, and finally policy pragmatism that opposes the proposals of mainstream political 
parties. 128 More recently, Marine Le Pen has led the FN movement as the party aims to secure 
the 2017 French Presidential election. Vinocur describes Le Pen’s leadership as “riding a revolt 
against a political class that voters view as ever more detached, arrogant and powerless.” 129 
Based on the FN’s 2012 policy manifesto, the policy priorities of the FN include a reduction in 
legal immigration to France (from 200,000 a year to 10,000), a ban on immigration rights to join 
a relative legally residing in France, the end of Schengen Area Agreement and a reinstatement of 
border checks, more stringent requirements to obtain French citizenship forcing applicants to 
exhibit a commitment to France, a priority to French citizens over foreigners for jobs, and a 
banning of dual nationality for non-Europeans which effectively targets citizens of former 
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French colonies in Africa. 130 131 Such an emphasis on restricting migration points toward an 
importance of the preservation of national identity which justifies, in the eyes of the FN and its 
supporters, all necessary measures required to uphold said identity. These include banning 
migrants and implementing structural barriers and difficulties for them to reside in France and 
become French citizens. The FN’s anti-migration claims also seem to be based on a rejection of 
the traditions, cultures, values, and languages that vary from what some consider a ‘true’ French 
identity. These external threats to the homogenous and exceptional French society place the 
migrant within a framework that labels him/her a security threat.  
 Making these anti-migration claims, the FN relies upon the history of securitization of 
migration in France and Europe and at the same time perpetuates the securitization of migration. 
Because political actors of the past began to identify and apply security terms to migrants, it 
provided a constructed discourse and rhetorical framework for the FN to later build upon and 
exploit the justifications for identifying migrants as security threats. The FN’s current policy 
proposals and strong anti-migrant rhetoric is somewhat an unintended consequence of the initial 
characterization of migrants as national security threats. Whether or not the inclusion of migrants 
actually jeopardizes French society, the public belief that it does gives the FN a receptive 
audience to the anti-migrant claims that are made. Furthermore, one can characterize the FN’s 
rhetoric in the French policy arena as promoting the securitization of migration as the party 
continually and unabashedly identifies migrants for what it sees as negative transformations of 
French cultural cohesion today.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has outlined the interrelationship between the securitization of migration and 
the rise of populist right wing parties, namely the Front National in France. The paper outlined 
the process of applying security terms to migration including the leading political actors and the 
ways that these parties conceptualize migrants as societal security threats. Through defining the 
ideologies of populist extreme-right parties, this paper also addressed the primacy of identity as a 
key reason why migrants are perceived as threats and why these political parties advocates for 
more restrictive migration policies. The paper’s main outcome aimed to delineate the process in 
which the FN relies on a history and rhetorical framework of securitization of migration to 
successfully make the anti-migrant claims that epitomize the party’s main policy platform.  
Within the larger European context, the rising populist political movement reveals the 
frustrations and skepticism of the political strength and control that the European Union has over 
continental issues like migration.  132 The current success of populist parties across Europe could 
have tremendous consequences for the future of the EU as many of these Eurosceptic parties call 
for a major reformation of the organization to better manage migration for the region. Finally, for 
an extension of research, it would be interesting to create an analytical comparison between the 
migration situation and the rise of right wing populism in France to that of the situation in the 
United States under the presidency of Donald Trump.  
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